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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DALE H. MALQUIST, * 
* 
Applicant/Petitioner, * 
vs. * Case No. 920005 
L.K. COMSTOCK & COMPANY, INC.,* 
EMPLOYER MUTUAL LIABILITY, * 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * 
UTAH and THE EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants/Respondents. * 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DALE MALQUIST'S 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied on the grounds that the 
administrative law judge's finding of no medical causation is 
supported by substantial evidence; and 
2. Whether Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied because Allen v. Industrial 
Commission did not require the administrative law judge to 
utilize the services of a medical panel. 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dale Malquist 
asks this Court to review the Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum 
Decision filed in Case No. 910181-CA on November 13, 1991. (See 
the Memorandum Decision attached hereto as Addendum MA.M) Mr. 
Malquist's Petition for Rehearing was denied December 6, 1991. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Mr. Malquist invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant 
to Rule 46(b) and Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to Article VIII Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, 
and Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5) (1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988) governs 
this case and reads as follows: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
. . . 
(g) The agency action is based 
upon a determination of fact, made 
or implied by the agency, that is 
not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court. . . 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1953 as amended) may be 
controlling. (The full text of this statute is attached hereto 
as Addendum "F.,f) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below, 
This case involves a disputed workers' compensation 
claim. Mr. Malquist maintains that in April and May of 1985 he 
sustained a compensable, on-the-job injury because of knee 
problems he allegedly incurred while working for defendant L. K. 
Comstock. 
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After a hearing on Mr. Malquist's claim, Administrative 
Law Judge Janet Moffitt ruled that the claim must be denied, 
because there was no showing of medical causation linking the 
applicant's knee problems to his employment with the defendants. 
(See Judge Moffitt's Order attached as Addendum lfB.M) Mr. 
Malquist filed a Motion for Review and requested that the Utah 
Industrial Commission reverse the administrative law judge's 
factual determination regarding medical causation. After 
reviewing the case, the Industrial Commission denied Mr. 
Malquist's Motion for Review and affirmed the administrative law 
judge's order. (See the Industrial Commission's Order attached 
as Addendum ,,C.M) 
Mr. Malquist then appealed the Industrial Commission's 
ruling. On November 13, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a 
Memorandum Decision summarily rejecting Mr. Malquist's appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently denied Mr. Malquist's 
Petition for Rehearing on December 6, 1991. (See the Order 
Denying Petition for Rehearing attached as Addendum "D.") 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Petitioner Dale H. Malquist worked for L.K. Comstock as 
a welder in April and May of 1985. (R. 470.)l To accomplish 
certain welding tasks, Mr. Malquist would occasionally have to 
kneel. (R. 482, 491.) Knee pads were readily available to all 
employees, but Mr. Malquist chose not to wear them. (R. 71, 482, 
*The designation "R. 470" is a citation to the Utah Court of 
Appeals' Record on Appeal, page 470. This citation device will be 
used for all references to the record. 
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492, 523-24.) As a result of his welding activities, 
Mr. Malquist seeks permanent partial disability compensation from 
respondents, L.K. Comstock, Wausau Insurance Companies and the 
Employers' Insurance Fund. (R. 1-9.) 
After Mr. Malquist quit his job in May 1985, he was 
sent to Federal prison in Lampoc, California. (R. 216, 479.) 
Upon his release in 1987, Mr. Malquist worked as an electrician 
in Missoula, Montana. (R. 217-18, 500.) That job resulted in an 
unrelated industrial accident to Mr. Malquist's low back and 
shoulder; it is believed that he is currently pursuing civil and 
workers' compensation lawsuits in Montana. (R. 218-20, 500-01.) 
At the Industrial Commission hearing held in front of 
Administrative Law Judge Moffitt on July 2, 1990, Mr. Malquist 
testified under oath that, prior to the alleged injury in 1985, 
he only had one prior incident of right knee pain. (R. 502-03.) 
On cross-examination, medical records were introduced showing 
that Mr. Malquist had previously suffered from lower extremity 
cramping, pain and vascular irregularities since at least 1962. 
(R. 504-06.) Furthermore, medical records in 1984 show that 
Mr. Malquist's knee problems were bilateral and had begun in 1979 
while he was working on the Minuteman Missile Project in Montana. 
(R. 396, 507-08.) 
In a letter dated October 27, 1987, Mr. Malquist asked 
his treating physician to submit a report to his Montana workers' 
compensation carrier indicating that his knee problems were the 
result of his employment on the Minuteman Missile Project in 
1979. (R. 104, 398.) (Mr. Malquist's correspondence dated 
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October 27, 1987, is attached hereto as Addendum f,E.lf) In that 
correspondence, Mr. Malquist overtly contradicts his current 
claim by stating that his ongoing knee problems are the direct 
result of his job at the Minuteman Missile Project in 1979. (Id.) 
At the Industrial Commission hearing, Mr. Malquist 
introduced several Affidavits. Exhibit "A-3" (R. 70) from 
Thomas R. Blaeske stated that two years after the alleged injury 
while working in Montana, Mr. Malquist: 
was complaining of pain in his knees, and by 
the end of the day, his knees were swollen 
and he was having trouble walking. Even the 
next day he would have problems. Sometimes 
the swelling would be so bad that I would 
have to drive him to and from work. (R. 70.) 
Note that Mr. Blaeske's Affidavit describes Mr. Malquist's knee 
condition over two years after the alleged industrial accident. 
Similarly, the Affidavit of Arny Brown (Exhibit "A-l") indicates 
that Mr. Malquist was having knee problems in 1987. (R. 69.) 
Finally, the Affidavit of Scott Gossard (Exhibit ,,A-2") states 
that knee protection was always available in 1985 while 
Mr. Malquist was working for L.K. Comstock. (R. 71.) 
In denying Mr. Malquist's claim, Administrative Law 
Judge Janet Moffitt found no medical connection between 
Mr. Malquist's current knee complaints and the alleged industrial 
injury. (R. 105-08.) Judge Moffitt also specifically found that 
Mr. Malquist's recollection of the source of his knee problems 
was not credible. (Id.) (Judge Moffitt's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Addendum 
"B.") 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Malquist contends that his Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule 46(b) and/or Rule 
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This contention 
is meritless. The Utah Court of Appeals' affirmance of the 
Industrial Commission's Order denying workers' compensation 
benefits is based on sound, well-settled legal principles. 
Because the Court of Appeals has properly applied the appropriate 
legal standards in reaching its decision, Mr. Malquist's Petition 
should be denied. 
Mr. Malquist bases his Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari on the erroneous contention that an Industrial 
Commission administrative law judge must submit every disputed 
industrial claim to a medical panel before the administrative law 
judge can enter his or her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order. Mr. Malquist misconstrues the roles of the 
administrative law judge and the medical panel. Under Utah law, 
an administrative law judge is the statutorily appointed finder 
of fact presiding over Industrial Commission hearings. If the 
administrative law judge, as fact finder, determines that there 
is insufficient medical evidence to support an applicant's claim, 
the judge has no obligation to submit the insufficient evidence 
to a medical panel. 
A medical panel is relied upon by an administrative law 
judge when a conflict in the parties' medical evidence raises a 
causation issue which the judge cannot resolve without the 
panel's expert, impartial assistance. However, when the medical 
6 
evidence is singularly one-sided (as in the present case), the 
administrative law judge has no obligation to obtain the 
assistance of a medical panel prior to entering a Finding of Fact 
and Order. 
As the following argument and review of the evidence 
demonstrates, Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt properly 
dismissed Mr. Malquist's claim. The judge had no obligation to 
submit any causation issue to the medical panel, because all 
competent medical evidence contained in the record points to one 
inescapable conclusion: Mr. Malquist's knee condition is not 
medically attributable to his employment with respondent L. K. 
Comstock. That finding of fact was based upon substantial 
medical evidence contained in the record. Additionally, the 
Commission's factual finding is bolstered by Mr. Malquist's 
untruthful testimony which directly conflicted with the 
objective, documentary medical evidence presented at the hearing. 
Because no credible, conflicting medical evidence exists, the 
administrative law judge's medical causation ruling is beyond 
reproach. Even if there is some minor conflict in the medical 
evidence, the Industrial Commission's factual finding on 
causation should be sustained because it is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF 
NO MEDICAL CAUSATION AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY 
ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Mr. Malquist contends that the Industrial Commission 
erred in affirming Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt's 
finding of no medical causation. Mr. Malquist suggests that 
Judge Moffitt and the Industrial Commission based their decision 
upon "serious misconstructions of the testimony and evidence", 
thereby rendering the denial of worker's compensation benefits 
"arbitrary and capricious." (See Mr. Malquist's Utah Court of 
Appeals Brief at pp. 4 and 10.) Given the nature of the error 
alleged by Mr. Malquist, resolution of this case involves a 
straightforward review of the administrative law judge's factual 
determination on causation. 
In conducting this review, the Utah Supreme Court 
affords significant deference to the Industrial Commission's 
final order: 
Our scope of review of factual findings 
in Industrial Commission cases is limited. . 
. . The reviewing court's inquiry is 
whether the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary and capricious" or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one finevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence" or without "any 
substantial evidence" to support them. Only 
then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. (Emphasis added.) 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987) 
(citations omitted). 
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In Lancaster, the administrative law judge concluded 
that medical causation was lacking despite the existence of 
substantial conflicting medical evidence. Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 
240. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "it is the 
responsibility of the administrative law judge to resolve factual 
conflicts" regarding medical causation. Id. at 241. As in 
Lancaster. the administrative law judge in the present case found 
medical causation to be lacking. Accordingly, Lancaster will 
govern Mr. Malquist's certiorari petition and will result in 
affirmance of the Commission's final order, particularly since 
the present case (unlike Lancaster) involves no credible 
conflicting medical evidence. 
Additionally, because Mr. Malquist/s Application for 
Hearing was filed after July 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") applies to this case. Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-22(l) (Repl. 1989). In Grace Drilling v. Board of 
Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of 
Appeals interpreted the UAPA and held that an agency's finding of 
fact will be affirmed unless the finding is not "'supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court.'"2 Id. at 67 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g) (1988)). Importantly, writing for a unanimous panel, 
Judge Billings stated: 
2This Court has stated that "'substantial evidence' is that 
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l 
Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990). 
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In undertaking such a review, this court 
will not substitute its judgment as between 
two reasonably conflicting views, even though 
we may have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before us for de novo 
review. It is the province of the [agency], 
not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting 
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences 
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is 
for the [agency] to draw the inferences. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68 (citations omitted). Accordingly, 
to prevail on appeal Mr. Malquist must somehow demonstrate that 
the Commission's medical causation conclusion is not one that a 
reasonable mind could have drawn. Mr. Malquist cannot make this 
showing because (1) all credible medical evidence contained in 
the record supports the Commission's final order, and (2) even if 
there is some minor conflict in the evidence, under Grace 
Drilling this Court will defer to the Commission's reasonable 
resolution of that conflict. 
Administrative Law Judge Moffitt's findings of no 
medical causation and lack of credibility are well supported by 
the medical evidence and testimony presented at the Industrial 
Commission hearing. 
As found by Judge Moffitt, Mr. Malquist has had lower 
extremity problems since 1960. (R. 403-07, 442-66.) In 1962, 
Mr. Malquist developed severe vascular problems in his right leg 
which continue to contribute to Mr. Malquist's knee condition. 
(R. 446-51.) In 1979, Mr. Malquist worked for the Federal 
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Government on the Minuteman Missile project in Montana. (R. 507-
08.) That job involved "cumulative kneeling on . . . cold, 
rugged surfaces . . . for over eight months . . . resulting in 
laxity of the conjoint tendon." (R. 396.) Dr. Walker indicated 
that the etiologic origin of Mr. Malquist's ongoing knee problem 
was the Minuteman Missile job. (Id.) 
On April 16, 1984, Mr. Malquist's treating physician 
described severe knee pain due to employment at the Minuteman 
Missile project. (R. 396.) On April 30, 1984, less than one 
year before Mr. Malquist began working for L.K. Comstock, Mr. 
Malquist was told to avoid kneeling. (R. 381.) On May 14, 1984, 
Dr. Walker even prescribed an inversion traction unit for 
"therapeutic use in circulatory disturbances of the lower 
extremities and also for pain reduction . . . in the knees." (R. 
393.) 
In April 1985, Mr. Malquist began working for L.K. 
Comstock as a welder. (R. 470) Knee pads were readily available 
to all employees whose jobs required kneeling. (R. 71, 482, 492, 
523-24.) Despite his long history of prior knee problems, Mr. 
Malquist testified under oath that he did not utilize the knee 
pads. (R. 492.) Further, Mr. Malquist never reported any prior 
knee problems to his supervisor. (R. 480.) 
Following the alleged industrial injury Mr. Malquist 
was incarcerated at a federal prison in Lampoc, California. (R. 
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216, 479.) Medical records from the prison doctor indicate that 
Mr. Malquist had no medical complaints during his incarceration 
or upon his release from prison. (R. 367.) Moreover, Mr. 
Malquist signed a statement confirming that fact. (Id.) 
After his release from prison Mr. Malquist returned to 
Montana and began working for Yellowstone Electric where he 
suffered a work-related injury to his arm, low back and shoulder. 
(R. 217-18, 500.) Mr. Malquist was awarded permanent partial and 
temporary total disability compensation. (R. 440.) Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Malquist commenced a claim against the State of 
Montana for his knee condition. (R. 398.) Mr. Malquist asserted 
that his knee problems were related to the 1979 Minuteman 
industrial injury. (R. 398.) In an attempt to marshal support 
for that claim, Mr. Malquist sent a very damaging letter to his 
former treating physician. He stated: 
I have started a claim against the State of 
Montana concerning the condition of my knees. 
They have deteriorated to the point where I 
am in constant pain after doing any kneeling 
or squatting and I can no longer work as an 
electrician . . . . The origination of this 
condition, in my opinion, was when I was 
working on the Minuteman Missile project in 
Montana in 1979 and I believe I mentioned 
that to you at the time I asked you to look 
at my knees. If you have that in your file 
or you remember that, please include that in 
your report. 
(R. 398.) In response, Dr. Walker sent correspondence to Mr. 
Malquist dated November 9, 1987: 
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The above patient presented to this office 
4/16/84 complaining of moderate to severe 
knee pains bilaterally, more pronounced along 
the medial collateral ligament areas and 
subpatellar, inferior. There was no edema or 
rubor present. Ambulation was painful. 
The patient had worked for the Federal 
Government in 1979, when the condition was 
first noticed. (Minute Man Missile project, 
Montana.) At that time, he had been on his 
knees eight months, and this created laxity 
of the conjoint tendon which was present upon 
the 4/16/84 examination. 
* * * 
The diagnosis of 4/16/84 was that of subacute 
manifest of chronic bilateral knee strain 
(Oria. injury 1979), by painfully limited 
ranges of motion and weakness of the medial 
collateral and anterior cruciate ligaments. 
Etiological origin: post-traumatic cumulative 
kneeling on the job, on cold, rugged 
surfaces. 
(R. 396, emphasis supplied.) 
In February of 1988, Mr. Malquist saw Dr. R.A. Sterling 
in Missoula, Montana. At the request of Mr. Malquist's former 
attorney, Richard J. Pyfer, Dr. Sterling proffered the following 
report which directly conflicts with Mr. Malquist's current 
claim: 
In addition, and not related to his on-the-
iob injury, is a knee condition - most 
probably chondromalacia of the patella with 
intermittent synovitis and hydrarthrosis of 
the knee (sometimes called water on the knee 
or fluid on the knee). 
(R. 263, emphasis supplied.) 
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On February 22, 1989, Mr. Malquist was admitted to St. 
Patrick Hospital in Missoula, Montana where a left knee MRI was 
performed by Dr. Wiese. (R. 416.) The MRI examination found 
extensive degenerative disease in Mr. Malquist's knees which is 
expected in a middle aged, overweight worker: 
I might comment that as patients age, more 
and more grade II signal abnormality is seen 
within the meniscal substance. This 
presumably represents "normal" degenerative 
change. I think a 46 y/o patient such as 
this, particularly of this patient's size 
(270 lbs.) would expect to have a certain 
amount of degenerative change in the menisci. 
(R. 416.) 
After Mr. Malquist presumably failed to obtain 
additional benefits in Montana, he filed a claim in Utah. (R. 
1.) On January 23, 1989, Mr. Malquist's Utah attorney requested 
Dr. Sterling to submit a report relating Mr. Malquist's knee 
condition to his employment at L.K. Comstock. (R. 277.) In his 
response dated March 2, 1989, Dr. Sterling noted that Mr. 
Malquist denied previous injuries to his knees. (R. 280.) 
Despite Mr. Malquist's untruthful denial, Dr. Sterling was unable 
to connect Mr. Malquist's knee condition with his employment at 
L.K. Comstock: 
As regards the knees, his diagnosis would be 
chondromalacia of the patella, bilateral, 
probable medial and lateral meniscus tears of 
the right knee, and possible medial and/or 
lateral meniscus tears of the left knee. 
• * * 
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This long after the fact, it is somewhat 
difficult to relate the current condition to 
any specific episode or incident in the past. 
(R. 281.) However, giving Mr. Malquist the benefit of the doubt, 
Dr. Sterling indicated that "it is not uncommon for a tear to 
occur with a squat, such as occurred over a one-month period of 
time on the job described in Utah. One or more tears could have 
occurred at that time and persisted to date." (Id.) (emphasis 
supplied). The foregoing statement from Dr. Sterling is the lone 
piece of evidence supporting Mr. Malquist's claim. However, 
because Dr. Sterling's opinion was not stated in terms of 
reasonable medical probability, it does not constitute credible 
medical evidence.3 Additionally, Dr. Sterling gave the above-
referenced opinion without knowledge of Mr. Malquist's 
preexisting knee history. 
3
 Medical opinions regarding medical causation must be stated 
in terms of reasonable medical probability and may not be 
speculative or stated in terms of possibility. Vause v. Industrial 
CommVn, 407 P.2d 1006, 17 Utah 2d 217 (Utah 1965). See also 
Workers Comp. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah App. 
1988); Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller. 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 
1983); Pruce v. Fruehauf Corp.. 496 P.2d 712, 27 Utah 2d 370 (Utah 
1972); Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Comm'n. 475 P.2d 835, 25 
Utah 2d 56 (Utah 1970). 
As in the case at bar, the employee in Vause offered medical 
causation testimony to the effect that the industrial exposure 
"could have" caused the employee's occupational disease. Vause, 
407 P.2d at 1008 (emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court 
discounted the employee's proffered medical evidence, indicating 
that opinions regarding medical causation must be stated in 
stronger terms. Id. 
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On October 3, 1989, Mr. Malquist was examined by Dr. 
Lionel Weeks at the request of L. K. Comstock and Wausau 
Insurance Companies. (R. 236.) Mr. Malquist untruthfully stated 
that his knee problems began in 1985 when he was working for 
L. K. Comstock and overtly omitted all reference to his prior 
knee problems while at the Minuteman Missile Project. (Id.) 
Notwithstanding, Dr. Weeks concluded that Mr. Malquist's knee 
problems "are primarily degenerative in nature" and that Mr. 
Malquist's "kneeling episodes in April and May of 1985. . . are 
not the cause of his knee problems." (R. 237.) 
Based upon the foregoing medical evidence, Judge 
Moffitt specifically found that Mr. Malquist's testimony was not 
credible and that there was no medical connection between his 
employment at L.K. Comstock and his current knee condition. (R. 
105-08.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Malquist filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industrial Commission of Utah. (R. 89.) After careful 
consideration of the record, the Industrial Commission 
unanimously affirmed Administrative Law Judge Moffitt's findings, 
stating as follows: 
With regard to the Applicant's failure to 
establish medical causation, Dr. Weeks 
conducted an independent medical evaluation 
of the Applicant and his medical records and 
Dr. Weeks concluded that the Applicant's knee 
problems "are primarily degenerative in 
nature" and that the Applicant's "kneeling 
episodes in April and May of 1985 . . . are 
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not the cause of his knee problems." . . . 
Thus, there is competent medical evidence in 
the record to support the administrative law 
judge's conclusion that medical causation is 
lacking. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 
736 P.2d 237, 241 (1987) (sic). 
The Commission is of the opinion that 
the trier of fact is in the best position to 
determine issues of credibility. . . . The 
Administrative Law Judge had the opportunity 
to observe the Applicant during the course of 
the hearing and found the Applicant to be 
lacking in the requisite credibility. For 
example, the Applicant was not candid with 
regard to his preexisting injuries. . . . In 
a letter to his physician, the Applicant 
asked that a letter be submitted to his 
Montana Workers' Compensation carrier to the 
effect that his knee problems were the result 
of his employment on the Minuteman Missile 
Project in 1979. Thus, the Administrative 
Law Judge's determination that the 
Applicant's credibility was lacking is 
supported by substantial credible evidence. 
(See the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review, 
attached hereto as Addendum "C") 
Mr. Malquist's subsequent request that the Utah Court 
of Appeals reverse the Industrial Commission was summarily denied 
in a Memorandum Decision issued November 13, 1991. In that 
Decision, the Court concludes that: 
. . .this appeal is a "straightforward" 
review of the factual determinations by the 
Industrial Commission on the issue of 
causation of petitioner's knee condition. . . 
We affirm the denial of benefits. 
A detailed recitation of the facts is 
unnecessary. . . .The factual determinations 
by the A.L.J, are supported by the 
substantial evidence in the record. 
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(See the Utah Court of Appeal's Decision attached as Exhibit 
HC.M) The Utah Supreme Court should similarly conclude that 
there is no basis for reversing the Industrial Commission's 
Order. 
POINT II 
ALLEN DID NOT REQUIRE THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE SUBMIT THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE TO 
A MEDICAL PANEL 
There is no question that Industrial Commission 
administrative law judges function as finders of fact with regard 
to the cases they adjudicate. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-10 
(1988). As fact finders, administrative law judges are afforded 
broad deference by this Court. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 
736 P.2d 237, 238-41 (Utah 1987) (It is the responsibility of the 
administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts regarding 
medical causation). 
As an administrative law judge adjudicates the merits 
of any given case, he or she may, in his or her discretion, 
utilize a medical panel to assist with the resolution of a 
conflict in the medical evidence. The use of and reliance upon a 
medical panel is in no way mandatory. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 
provides that: 
. . . Upon the filing of a claim for 
compensation for injury by accident . . . 
arising out of and in the course of 
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employment . . . the Commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the Commission. 
* * * 
The Commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants, but is not 
bound by the report if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Malquist is plainly mistaken when he contends that 
Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt erred, as a matter of law, 
in not submitting the present case to a medical panel. The 
discretion exercised by Judge Moffitt falls well within the 
parameters of § 35-1-77. Indeed, as this Court announced in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 24-5 (Utah 1986) 
,f[t]here is no fixed formula by which the causation issue may be 
resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each 
case." (Emphasis added.) Mr. Malquist/s Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari is, therefore, baseless. 
CONCLUSION 
Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt correctly found 
that the preponderance of the evidence elicited below does not 
support Mr. Malquist's claim for compensation. The requisite 
medical causation linking Mr. Malquist's knee complaints to his 
employment with L. K. Comstock does not exist. That finding of 
fact was based upon substantial medical evidence submitted at the 
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hearing below. The administrative law judge had no obligation to 
call upon the services of a medical panel in a case where the 
evidence was so singularly one-sided. 
Because no credible, conflicting medical evidence 
exists, the administrative law judge's medical causation ruling 
is beyond reproach. Even if there is some minor conflict in the 
medical evidence, the Commission's factual finding on causation 
should be sustained because it is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
Based upon the administrative law judge's Findings of 
Fact and in light of this Court's standard for reviewing such 
findings, the final order entered below would be summarily upheld 
if the Court were to grant Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. Accordingly, the Petition should be denied. 
DATED this Hr day of February, 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
-ma*jtf {AJJLndf7/\ 
Michael E. Dyer 
Michael A. Peterson 
Attorneys for L.K. Comstock 
& Company, Inc., and Wausau 
Insurance Companies 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, on this ^j- day of February, 1992, to the following: 
Mr. Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Mr. Dale H. Malquist 
P.O. Box 633 
Lincoln, Montana 59639 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
v^LZ,, d&?\ 
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Dale H. Malquist, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission, the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund, 
L.K. Comstock & Company, and 
Employer Mutual Liability, 
Respondents. 
Ufa** Court o*Appeafe 
MEMORANDUM "DECISION 
(Not For P u b l i c a t i o n ] 
Case No. 910181-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 1 3 , 1991) 
O r i g i n a l P r o c e e d i n g i n t h i s Cour t 
Attorneys: Dale Malquist, Lincoln, Montana, Petitioner Pro Se 
Michael E. Dyer, Brad C. Betebenner, and Michael A. 
Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood. 
PER CURIAM: 
Petitioner seeks review of the denial of workers/ 
compensation benefits .for knee injuries petitioner allegedly 
suffered in 1985. The administrative law judge (A.L.J.) found 
insufficient evidence of a medically caused connection between 
petitioner's alleged industrial accident in April and May, 1985 
and his current knee condition. The Industrial Commission 
affirmed the A.L.J., finding "competent medical evidence in the 
record to support the . . . conclusion that medical causation is 
lacking.11 Petitioner filed a petition for review in this court. 
We agree that this appeal is a "straightforward" review of 
the factual determinations by the Industrial Commission on the 
issue of causation of petitioner's knee condition. We have 
reviewed the arguments by petitioner and compared the record 
herein with his claim that the findings of the A.L.J, and the 
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm 
the denial of benefits. 
A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary. We refer 
the parties to the A.L.J.'s findings' and the order. The factual 
determinations by the A.L.J, are' supported by substantial 
evidence in the-record. We adopt herein the conclusions and_ 
opinion of Jthe Commission in" denying Petitioner's-request for 
review. We are not required to accept the selective. f acts__ _ 
advanced" by Petitioner to support his arguments. - Nor do we adopt 
the conclusions drawn'by him from those facts. Grace Dri-lling v. 
Bd. of Review,.-776 .P. 2d 63 (Utah App~. 1989). 
The decision of i:he Commission is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record that Petitioner has failed in his burden 
to establish a causal connection between his 1985 employment and 
his knee injury. A doctor's expressions of possibilities that 
petitioner's kneelinq in 1985 "could have" contributed to 
petitioner's present physical condition and not that it did so 
are, on the whole, insufficient to even present a prima facie 
case of causation. Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 
217, 220, 407 P.2d 1006f 1008 (1965). The evidence does not, in 
this case, ensure a medically demonstrable causal link between 
petitioner's work activities and his condition. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). 
The order of the Commission is affirmed. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Russell,^". Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood -, Judge 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 89000297 
DALE H. MALQUIST, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
L. K. COMSTOCK & uun^AWi ana/or 
WAUSAU INSURANCE and 
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 2, 1990, 
at 1:00 o'clock p.m.. Said hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented himself at the 
proceedings. 
Defendant employer and insurance carrier was 
represented by Michael Dyer, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator. 
The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows: 
1. Whether the applicant, Dale Malquist, sustained 
injuries as a result of compensable industrial 
accident between April 6, 1985 and May 15, 1985. 
2. Medical causation between the applicant's claimed 
injuries and the employment activities. 
3. Permanent partial impairment and apportionment of 
impairment for pre-existing conditions. 
4. Medical expenses. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant in this matter, Dale H. Malquist, was employed by the 
defendants from early April of 1985 through the middle of June, 1985. The 
applicant was working as a designated welder on the project and was earning 
wages sufficient to entitle him to the maximum in workers compensation 
benefits. One of the projects that the applicant was involved in required him 
to do welding on a catwalk with a grating. Ke was involved in cutting angle 
iron and drilling it for attachment. This involved moving along the grating 
on his knees, placing his hand through the rails, grinding off a clean spot 
and attaching the angle iron with a U-bolt. He would then move on his knees 
approximately seven inches to the next weld spot. The grating, as one would 
expect, was ridged with each ridge being approximately two inches apart. It 
was the applicant's testimony that approximately two weeks after beginning 
work on this job, he began to have swelling and pain in his knees. He first 
reported it to his supervisor, Curtis Hunt, approximately four weeks after he 
started. He was directed to go to the site clinic on May 8th, and saw the 
medical tech there who gave him some pain medication. No other treatment was 
rendered nor were any x-rays taken. It was the applicant's testimony that he 
did not wear knee pads throughout this process and was not aware that any were 
available. 
The applicant was terminated in the middle of May and never got any 
treatment for his knees. Instead, he was sent to prison. It was his testimony 
that he saw the doctor in prison for his knees although there is no clear 
records of that. He was released from prisorr in February of 1987, and began 
receiving treatment for an industrial injury for his low back. He has been 
treated by Dr. Sterling. He began treatment of the applicant's knees in 
December of 1987, after the applicant had some incidents of pain in his knees 
after doing some kneeling and squatting at home. There was no initial mention 
to Dr. Sterling of the alleged industrial injury. Dr. Sterling simply 
prescribed anti-inflammatories for the applicant. 
For the next three months after his release, the applicant attempted 
to do some electrical work in Missoula, Montana. He stated that he had 
difficulty doing this work because of problems with kneeling. Thereafter, he 
sustained injuries as the result of an industrial accident to his back and 
shoulder and has not worked since. Dr. Sterling has continued to treat the 
applicant's knees and has recommended arthroscopic surgery. 
The applicant called Curtis Hunt, his former supervisor, to testify 
on his behalf. Mr. Hunt who was very straight forward and credible in his 
testimony indicated and confirmed the applicant's length of employment and the 
fact that the applicant had worked on some grating. He described the applicant 
as a satisfactory worker. He did remember that the applicant had complained 
of knee pain when he kneeled. Mr. Hunt testified that knee pads were readily 
available to the employees but did not know if the applicant wore knee pads. 
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He described the applicant's actual work activities in a similar manner to the 
description given~ by bhe applicant. The applicant never ~ informed his 
supervisor that he ^ ad prior knee problems. 
Although the applicant tried to down play knee problems prior to 
1985, they have been significant. The applicant, as early as 1962, had 
problems with muscles in his right leg as well as feet problems. In 1970, he 
developed a vascular problem in his right leg and was diagnosed as having 
vascular disease which contributed to some knee pain. In 1979, the applicant 
was working on the Minute Man missile project for an employer and had severe 
pain in both knees. At that time, he was diagnosed as having pattelar bursitis 
and was told to avoid all kneeling. In 1984, shortly before going to work for 
the defendants, the applicant saw a chiropractor, Dr. Walker, for a twisted 
knee in California. X-rays were taken of both of his knees at that time and 
the applicant was again instructed to avoid kneeling. 
On cross-examination, it was also brought out that the applicant, in 
addressing the 1985 knee exposure with Dr. Sterling, had never mentioned to 
him his two prior major treatments including the treatment of Dr. Walker in 
California and the treatment in 1979, where he was diagnosed as having 
pattelar bursitis. The medical records also include a letter from the 
applicant dated October 27, 1987, to Dr. Walker in California, concerning a 
claim he had made in the state of Montana about the condition of his knees. 
At that time, Mr. Malquist asked the doctor to submit information to Montana, 
stating that he believed the source of his knee problems to have been his work 
on the Minute Man missile project in 1979. In addition to this rather damning 
evidence, the applicant also submitted an affidavit of a fellow employee who 
had worked with him on the IPP project. Part of the statement that he made 
was that during the times that he had workeci on his knees, he had always been 
provided with knee protection. It shouLd be noted that he was working on the 
same project as the applicant in 1985. 
After a review of all of the testimony and medical records in this 
matter, the Administrative Law Judge does not believe that the applicant is a 
credible witness with regard to the source of his knee problems. While it may 
be true that the applicant's problems were briefly aggravated by kneeling, it 
is certainly true based on all of the medical records, that there is not a 
medical causation between his current need for surgery and the industrial 
incidents in 1985. The applicant has received continuous treatment since 
1979, for his knee problems. The only definitive overall report submitted in 
this matter was that of Dr. Weeks, who examined the applicant at the request 
of the defendants. Even Dr. Weeks was not privy to the information concerning 
the applicant's 1979 injuries, and he determined that the needed surgery would 
not in any way be related to the applicant's alleged industrial injury in 1985, 
but to pre-existing meniscal tears and patello-femoral arthritis. Accordingly, 
the Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that the applicant's claim for 
benefits fails both on credibility on testimony of the applicant about problems 
he may have brought to the job and by reasons of medical causation. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant in this matter, Dale Malquist, has failed to demonstrate 
that there is a medically causal relationship between his industrial activities 
in April and May of_ 1985, and his current knee injrury. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Dale H. Malquist, for 
benefits arising from an alleged knee injury in April of 1985, be, and the 
same is hereby, dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
(^JfhjSc?? -
y Janet L. Mofi^itt Z 
/ Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
t\J t^js day of August, 1990. 
ATTE 
Patricia 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
JCp-yh-Jt, 
A D D E N D U M C 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OB* UTAH 
Case No. 89000297 
DALE H. HALOUIST * 
A p p l i c a n t , * ORDER DENYING 
* 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
L.K. COMSTOCK & COMPANY", * 
EMPLOYER MUTUAL LIABILITY and * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah on Motion of the Applicant, Dale 
H. Malquist, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge in the 
above-entitled matter dated August 31, 1990, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
On August 31, 1990, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law 
Judge of the Commission wherein it was concluded that the Applicant's claim 
should be dismissed because of a lack of credibility and a lack of medical 
causation. 
On October 24, 1990, the Applicant, acting pro se, filed a Motion 
for Review alleging that the Administrative Law Judge abused her discretion 
in failing to apply the legal standards outlined for cases involving 
preexisting injuries in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986), 
in concluding that there was a lack of medical causation evidence in this 
case, and in her conclusion that the Applicant was not a credible witness. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above-entitled case and the Commission is af the 
opinion that the Motion for Review should be denied. 
The Commission finds no grounds on which to reverse the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge. The Applicant asserts that the Administrative 
Law Judge failed to apply the two prong test for legal and medical causation 
which an Applicant must sustain in order to obtain benefits where the case 
involves preexisting injuries. This objection is invalid because the alleged 
industrial accident occurred between April and June of 1985, long before the 
Allen decision by the Utah Supreme Court. 
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The ALJ did not abase her discretion because she applied the 
correct standards as they stoodprior to the Allen decision. The_ ALJ's Order 
discusses medical causation in-some detail._ Further, even under Allen -the 
Applicant's j>bjection^"must fail. "In the event the claimant cannot show a 
medical causal connection, compensation should be denied." Allen- v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P..2d IS (Utah 1986). 
In addition, the ALJ made subordinate findings of fact which fully 
support her ultimate findings of f_act and' conclusions of law, and thus itr Is 
clear she did _not err in applying the appropriate legal standards. Glen ~M. 
Barney & Sons v. Industrial Comm'n, 609 P. 2d 948 ("Utah 1980). 
With regard to the Applicant's failure to establish medical 
causation, Dr. Weeks conducted an independent medical evaluation of the 
Applicant and his medical records and Dr. Weeks concluded that the 
Applicant's knee problems "are primarily degenerative in nature" and that the 
Applicant's "kneeling episodes in April and May of 1985...are not the cause 
of his knee problems." In addition, the Applicant's physician, Dr. Walker, 
stated on April 16, 1984 that the etiological origin of the Applicant's knee 
problems was "post-traumatic cumulative kneeling on the job, on cold, rugged 
surfaces." Thus, there is competent medical evidence in the record to 
support the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that medical causation is 
lacking. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237, 241 (1987). 
The Commission is of the opinion that the trier of fact is in the 
best position to determine issues of credibility. This is true primarily 
because the trier of fact has the unique opportunity to directly observe the 
Applicant and the demeanor of witnesses. The Administrative Law Judge had 
the opportunity to observe the Applicant during the course of the hearing and 
found the Applicant to be lacking in the requisite credibility. For example, 
the Applicant was not candid, with regard to his preexisting injuries. The 
Applicant testified under oath that, prior to the alleged injury in 1985 he 
had only oae prior incident of right knee pain. On cross-examination, 
medical records were introduced showing that the Applicant had suffered -from 
lower extremity cramping, pain and vascular irregularities since, 1962 .-
Further, the Applicant's testimony regarding the treatment and origin of his 
knee injuries contradicted the records of his own physicians. In a letter to 
his physician the Applicant asked that a letter be submitted to his Montana 
workers' compensation carrier to the effect that his knee problems were the 
result of his employment on the Minuteman Missile project in 1979. Thus, the 
Administrative Law Judge's determination that the Applicant's credibility was 
lacking is supported by substantial credible evidence. 
For the foregoing reasons it is the opinion of the Commission that 
the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be affirmed. In affirming, the 
Commission adopts the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that t,he Order ofL the Administrative Law 
Judge of August 31, 1990, is hereby affirmed, and the Motion for Review is 
hereby denied. 
toy appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) 
days of the date hereof, pursuant to Utah Code .Annotated, Sections 
35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and ' 63-46b~16. Industrial Commission costs to 
prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes shall be borne by 
the appellant. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman /1 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Dixie L. Minson 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/^ Vl) day of March 1991. 
ATTK 
^^A^,^)CQ^h^J. 
Patricia 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
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Dale H. Malquist 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission, the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund, L.K. Comstock 
& Company, and Employer Mutual 
Liability 
Respondents. 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 910181-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon petitioner's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 26, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this ±r - day of December, 1991.. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mary « J Noonan 
Clerk \£f the Court 
A D D E N D U M E 
Dale H. Malquist 
P.O. Box -86L-
Lincolh, MT 59639 
October 27, 1987-
Philip LJ .Walker, D.c. 
288 Lewelling-_31vd. 
San Lorenzo_,~CA 945a0 
Dear Dr. Walker; 
I have started a claim against the State of Montana 
concerning the condition of my knees. They have deterioated to 
the_point where I am in constant pain after doing any kneeling or 
squating and I can no" longer work as an electrician. When you 
examined and treated them, I believe it was under a workman's 
comp claim. The origination of this condition, in my opinion, was 
when I was working on the Minuteman Missle Project in Montana in 
1979, and I believe I mentioned that to you at the time I asked 
you to look at my knees. If you have that in your file or you 
remember that, please include that in your report. To have 
something done I must establish that the condition resulted from 
work performed in Montana. 
Additionally, I request records and information to be sent 
concerning my knees only. 
Sincerely, 
Dale H. Malquist 
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payment" near the beginning of Subsection to dependents did not exceed $30,000, the em 
(2)(a)(ii); substituted "an amount" for "a 
weekly amount" and "persons" for "person" in 
Subsection (2)(b)(ii); and deleted former Sub-
section (2)(d) providing that if the total award 
ployer or its insurance carrier was to pay the 
difference between the award and $30,000 into 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Apportionment of liability. 
—Prerequisite. 
Impairment not meeting 10% minimum. 
Cited. 
-ApportionmenF of liability. 
The purpose of this section is to apportion 
liability only where an industrial injury mea-
surably contributes to a permanent disability 
caused in part by a pre-existing conditio^ not 
simply to impose liability on the Employer's 
Reinsurance Fund any time a worker's disabil-
ity is caused by a pre-existing condition. Virgin 
v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
—Prerequisite. 
Entitlement to benefits is a prerequisite to 
consideration of apportionment. Where the dis-
ability is the result of preexisting conditions 
and not an industrial accident,-a claimant is 
hot entitled to disability benefits. Large v. In-
dustrial-Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Impairment not ineeting 10% minimum. 
Where claimant's industrially-caused 5% im-
pairment of the back did not meet the 10% 
threshold minimum requirement, he- could not 
combine the permanent impairment resulting 
from separate industrial injuries with the 
same employer in order to reach the threshold 
necessary for compensation of preexisting con-
ditions, neither caused nor aggravated by any 
of the industrial injuries. Otvos v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 751 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Cited in American Roofing Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d 
1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of computation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Hourly employees. 
—Minimum hours. 
The fact that an employee voluntarily lim-
ited his work hours to 13 per week did not 
make it unfair to award him compensation 
benefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had 
intended to limit an hourly employee to the 
actual number of hours he or she worked per 
week in calculating the compensation rate, the 
Legislature would not have included a statu-
tory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection (l)(e). 
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report —- Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the 
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due 
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission 
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shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical 
panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim: 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted casex the commission in its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with jespect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the'use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they-shall be allowed to function in jthe same 
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X rays, and ^perform suctrtests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as i f may 
determine to be_ necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical .director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from per-
forming work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of 
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occu-
pational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, pro-
longed, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, 
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so 
contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
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(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, leted the former second sentence, -which read 
Supp.» 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969, "The panel shall have the qualifications gener-
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41, ally applicable to the medical panel under Sec-
4 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13. tion 35-2-56", added Subsections (l)(b) and (c) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- and redesignated former Subsection (lXblas 
ment, effective April 29, 199T, substituted the (l)(d), and added the second sentence in Sub-
first "and"jbr "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de- section (2)(b) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Referral to panel. 
-Effect of 1982 amendment —Discretion. 
Referral to panel The court of appeals cannot say that the ad-
Discretion ministrative law judge abused his discretion in 
Cited not referring the case to a medical panel when 
there was medical evidence to support his find-
Effect of 1982 amendment. ing of medical causation Workers' Comp Fund 
In accord with bound volume See Ortiz v
 v industrial Comm'n, 761 P 2d 572 (Utah Ct. 
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P 2d 1092 (Utah Ct
 A p p 1 9 8 8 ) 
App 1989) 
This section is procedural and may be ap- Cited in Rekward v Industrial Comm'n, 755 
plied to an accident that occurred prior to the P 2d 166 (Utah Ct App 1988), USX Corp v. 
1982 amendments Ortiz v Industrial Comm'n, Industrial Comm'n, 781 P 2d 883 (Utah Ct 
101 Utah Adv Rep 60 (Ct App 1989) App 1989) 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify 
award — Authority to destroy records — Interest 
on award — No authority to change statutes of 
limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time 
modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases 
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total 
permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 
35-1-9&, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statutes of limitations contained fn other sections of this chapter or Chap-
ter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917, 1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8; 1990, 
§ 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961, ch. 69, § 4. 
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1; Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
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